International Journal of Modern and Classical History
(ISSN: XXXX-XXXX)
Vol. 1, Iss. 2 , 2026
DOI: XXX XXX

Maritime Capitalism, Pepper Politics, and the Limits of Corporate Empire: The Dutch East India Company (VOC) in Early Modern Malabar"

C.S.Biju

Professor, Sacred Heart College, Kochi, Kerala. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4058-3613, Email - csbijustc@gmail.com

Received: 02/06/2026 Revised: 07/07/2026 Acceptance: 15/07/2026 Published: 22/07/2026

Abstract

This article focuses on the transformation of the Dutch East India Company (also known as the Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, or VOC) through its early years in operation on the Malabar Coast. Instead of looking at it purely as a representation of Dutch capitalism at sea, the article places the growth, ambitions and limitations of the company within the context of Kerala's pepper economy. Founded in 1602 as a joint stock corporation with quasi-sovereign authority, the VOC was able to use its position as an important company during the Dutch Golden Age to play a large role in overseas trade, navy, new forms of finance and empire building. On the Malabar Coast the VOC tried to replace Portuguese authority, acquire pepper through treaties and monopolistic contracts, strengthen settlements along the coast and integrate local trading networks into Dutch maritime capitalism. The VOC reached the peak of its influence in Kerala when it seized Cochin in 1663 and established Dutch Malabar as an independent command at the end of 1669. At the same time, however, Malabar also illustrated the limitations of the VOC's power. Its reliance on negotiated monopolies for pepper, inability to dominate inland production, high-cost military obligations, struggles with the Travancore state, and competition from the English East India Company all caused problems for the company. In 1741, the Dutch suffered a crushing defeat at Colachel that symbolised the decline of their political power in south-western India. The events of the 18th Century: corruption, debt, war spending and declining competitiveness all contributed to the breakdown of the VOC's (Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie or United East India Company) institutions. This article states that the VOC's history within Malabar reveals an even larger paradox: that the VOC's rise was based upon the use of maritime organisation, of monopoly rights and coercive diplomacy, but that their eventual decline was due to the inability of commerce to bring a permanent form of control to the complex regional economies, the existence of local sovereigns and the changing relationship of the VOC to the global capitalist economy.

Keywords: Dutch East India Company; VOC; Malabar Coast; Pepper Trade; Cochin; Dutch Golden Age; Colonial Commerce; Travancore; Colachel; Indian Ocean History; Maritime Empire; East India Companies

Introduction

The VOC is a key player in the history of early modern capitalism, the maritime empires and European expansion into Asia. Formed in 1602 by the States-General of the Republic of the Netherlands, the VOC was more than simply an institution for trading as generally defined. It was a commercial-sovereign institution with the right to declare war, enter treaties, build forts, maintain troops, govern colonial territories and retain a monopoly over commerce in large populations within the Indian and Asian oceans. The VOC brought together the interests associated with finance, naval power, mapping, colonial violence (and now) global commodity circulation. The VOC's rise occurred at the same time as the Dutch Republic's Golden Age: a time when the Dutch Republic was evolving as a centre for commerce, banking, shipping, scientific development, visual arts and maritime expansion.

It isn't possible to understand the past of the VOC through the city of Batavia alone, or the port city of Amsterdam, or even only the Indonesian Spice Isles. The sources for the VOC operations throughout the Indian Ocean included the network of the VOC's neutral coastal locations, alliances created through negotiation, and the specific nature of the commodities traded. One of the areas where the VOC operated in particular was the Malabar Coast, which grew large amounts of black pepper. Not only was black pepper a luxury food item to eat in Europe; it was also a strategically important commodity. The control of it would generate vast amounts of profits; provide substantial economic resources for the Netherlands, and provide significant commercial prestige. The contemporary Malabar Coast as a spice-producing and exporting region contained many of the most desirable port locations (e.g. Calicut, Cochin, Cannanore, Quilon). The Portuguese, prior to the arrival of the Dutch, had already established their dominance over the Malabar Coast by building forts, applying maritime violence, and implementing cartaz-based maritime control. The VOC's entry into this long history of competition was in the role of a militarized corporate entity with the intention of removing the Portuguese and restructuring the procurement of pepper through Dutch monopoly control.

In examining the development and subsequent decline of one of the largest multinational corporations in European history, the VOC (Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie), the authors of this chapter investigate the VOC experiences in Malabar. Malabar represented both a zone of success for the Dutch and one of limitation. The VOC achieved significant dominance over the Kerala coast through the conquest of Cochin in 1663 and establishment of the Dutch Malabar Command in 1669. Nonetheless, the Dutch were never able to achieve total control over pepper production or to dominate the political dynamics of Malabar. Rather, the company relied heavily on treaties with local authorities, extension of credit to merchants, military protection of coastal forts, negotiation with local leaders, and tenuous agreements with coastal and interior middlemen. Moreover, while pepper was the commodity that drew the VOC to Malabar, it ultimately captured it within an unsteady political economy. Pepper grew in both interior and semi-interior ecological zones but the Dutch maintained the greatest strength at the ocean's edge. The North Sea port cities had more access to ships/forts than the interior areas had to forests/cultivators/merchant class and regional powers.

There are several reasons for the decline of the VOC in Malabar, including the growth of Travancore under Marthanda Varma, the defeat of the Dutch at Colachel, the increasing strength of the English East India Company, increased military and administrative expenses for the English East India Company, decreasing profitability from the monopoly on spice trade, and the Dutch Republic's decline in power during the 18th century. Malabar shows that the decline of the VOC was not just an isolated incident; it has been caused by a prolonged crisis that was caused by the conflict between the VOC's goal of having a maritime monopoly and the complexities of the land. The VOC was created primarily on the sea, but their goal of controlling the pepper trade warrants a continuing and durable control over land, labor, and sovereignty. This control was not achieved.

The Dutch Golden Age and the Institutional Formation of the VOC

The VOC appeared as a result of the economic and political energy of the Republic of the Netherlands. The community of the Dutch Republic were fighting against the domination of Spain's House of Habsburgh. New opportunities for maritime business were being created and Amsterdam was rapidly becoming the financial centre of the world. While small in area, the Dutch Republic had developed an unimaginable amount of shipping, credit, insurance, naval power and distance commerce. The VOC was created in 1602 by combining various Dutch companies that had previously been in competition into one company with a chartered monopoly on trade to the East of the Cape of Good Hope. By doing so, the competition that existed between Dutch merchants was eliminated and the resources of the Republic could be pooled and managed through a singular corporate form with one entity that would carry all of the capital, risk and violence associated with the trade they were involved in.

At its core the VOC was a unique institution that fused commercial power and political power. The VOC was able to issue shares, obtain capital, construct fleets, establish fortified trading posts and negotiate with the rulers of Asia. The VOC answered to a board of directors located in the Republic of the Netherlands; the Heeren XVII, however the VOC was free to conduct its affairs autonomously in its Asian trading territories. The headquarters of the VOC was established in Batavia, where the VOC established an integrated network of maritime commerce linking Indonesia with Ceylon, India, Japan, Persia, Cape and Europe. The strength of the VOC was derived from the ability of the company to provide maritime mobility.

The Dutch Golden Age provided considerable material and ideological reinforcement to the VOC. The extensive wealth of this nation found notable expression through painting, science, and urban culture, as well as cartography. One of the more remarkable examples of corporate power ever seen anywhere in the world, the Republic gave birth to such artistic talents as Rembrandt, Vermeer, Huygens and Spinoza. Dutch paintings of the era frequently depicted exotic goods, sophisticated interiors, and the prosperity of trade; behind each of these household scenes were global trade systems that included spices, sugar, textiles, porcelain, tea, coffee, slaves and other luxury goods. As a result, the VOC was a major source of support for Dutch culture. The scientific and cartographic accomplishments of the Republic also contributed to expanding its imperial territory. Advances in navigation, maps and shipbuilding provided tangible means for creating an empire—it was not just an intellectual discipline.

However, the VOC also had many traits that would later contribute to its failure. Because it was built on monopolistic access to lucrative markets, the VOC required continual resource-investment and protection of access to stated markets through physical means. Forts needed to be maintained, soldiers paid, officers supervised, competitors eliminated, and local allies rewarded monetarily. The quasi-state authority of the VOC enabled it to expand its authority but consequently increase and accelerate costs. In areas of the world where direct monopolistics could only be obtained through physical military might (territory), the VOC could provide for large profits. In areas where commodity production was decentralised and local political authorities were not easily usurped, the VOC monopoly was threatened Malabar.

Malabar before Dutch Supremacy: Portuguese Power and Pepper Politics

Before the Dutch secured a major position on the Malabar coast, the Portuguese had attempted to Control the pepper trade using various forms of naval power, fortified areas and political alliances. The arrival of the Portuguese at the end of the 15th century did not make up the spice trade at Malabar - as there were many different types of merchants including Arabs, Gujaratis, Chinese and regional merchants, all trading in spice before the Portuguese arrived in Malabar. The port of Calicut was an established port due to its openness to merchants and had connections with the inland areas that produced pepper. The Portuguese changed this commercial system by using military force and creating a European power at sea creating the desire to control the sea lanes and the flow of spice to and from Europe.

The Portuguese established their presence in Cochin, Calicut and other coastal cities through alliances with local rulers and by establishing fortified posts. Conflict arose between the Zamorin of Calicut and the Portuguese and the establishment of an alliance between the Cochin and the Portuguese led to conflict and ultimately led to opportunities for later Dutch settlement. The arrival of the Dutch East India Company in Malabar was, in part a response to the Portuguese, who they were trying to remove from the area. Throughout the 17th century, as the Dutch expanded their influence throughout the Indian Ocean, they systematically expelled the Portuguese from many of their established posts. The

Dutch also formed alliances with the local rulers while pursuing a monopoly of trade.
In 1663, the Dutch ended their campaign against the Portuguese in Cochin, when they took control of Cochin as a fortified position, a symbolic victory of their dominance over the Portuguese, and a regional centre for the purchase of pepper. However, capturing Cochin did not give the VOC control over the rest of Malabar. The VOC did not automatically control the inland pepper simply because they had captured the coastal forts. The VOC still needed to negotiate with many kings, chiefs, merchants and producers in a politically fragmented region in order to be able to supply themselves with inland pepper. In addition, the VOC also had to operate within a fragmented society where sovereignty was distributed among various groups of people, including owners of individual rights, people who had negotiated those rights, and people whose rights were attached to the local hierarchy.

Dutch Malabar and the Attempt to Secure Pepper Monopoly
Creation of Dutch Malabar as an independent command within the VOC in 1669 developed the Dutch ambitions on the coasts of Kerala further. The VOC was working in 1669 to set up ways to increase their ability to buy pepper through the creation of treaties, contracts and political pressure on kings and chiefs to grant them exclusive rights to buy pepper. In exchange for granting the VOC exclusive rights to buy pepper, the VOC promised to pay them, provide military assistance and provide diplomatic recognition. The VOC believed that by using coastal diplomacy, they could assure themselves that they could buy pepper from producers in the interior. This belief was only partly correct.
The social structure surrounding pepper production and distribution in Malabar was complex. The cultivation and harvesting of pepper relied on various interdependent systems and sources (e.g. local agrarian systems, edge-of-forest economies, landlord networks, caste-based labour arrangements and merchant credit). Coastal rulers could promise the exclusive supply of pepper, yet enforcement of this supply chain through local cultivators, merchants and other competing buyers was never realised because of limited power. Consequently, the VOC encountered continual leaks from the market. English, French and local Indian merchants continued to access pepper from various/every available source, including through smuggling, private trade and unofficial transactions. The effective monopoly of pepper that the VOC maintained was compromised.
The viability of the Dutch's monopolistic position was greatly augmented by their existing fortifications. Cochin, Quilon, Cranganore, Cannanore and other locations acted as military-commercial facilities. These fortifications allowed for the protection of storage facilities, VOC officials and access to waterways and shipping; however, these fortifications were costly and represented the greatest share of VOC expenditures. As the VOC attempted to maintain the monopoly of pepper through an increased military presence, their costs increased commensurately. Although Malabar pepper was certainly commercially viable, it did not have an unlimited value. If the cumulative costs of established military garrisons, diplomatic activities and warfare exceeded the commercial revenues derived from the pepper trade, the monopolistic advantage of the VOC was self-defeating.
Tension Between Trade and Sovereignty: Officially, the VOC was a commercial venture; however, practically speaking, commercial activity involved political interference. As a result, they would intervene in succession disputes, negotiate treaties, threaten rulers with military force, defend their allies, and punish competitors in order to obtain the goods they desired, such as pepper. This political interference ultimately made the VOC subject to external forces they could not control.

Local Sovereignty and the Limits of Corporate Power
The Malabar Coast was not a vacant landscape; it was a very politicized region with rulers, deities, chiefs, banks, warriors, and farmers. Thus, the Dutch needed to engage in negotiations with the Zamorin of Calicut as well as with the rulers of Cochin, Travancore, Kayamkulam, Quilon and others. The rulers had no intention of allowing Europeans to take advantage of their resources without some return. (They regularly played different European companies against one another.) They also resisted monopolies if that would ultimately cost them revenue and changed alliances based on the shifts in the local political climate.
The company's efforts to monopolize pepper through agreements faced frequent lack of stability.

Agreements signed under pressure could easily be broken by a ruler, and chiefs could trade their agreed upon share of pepper to alternative sources. Although merchants accepted advanced payments from the Dutch, they frequently participated in alternative trade at the same time. The English East India Company further manipulated this weakness, and in contrast to the Portuguese, became a growing structural rival in the 1700s, enhanced by increased naval, financial, and territorial strength.
The Dutch were strongest when they could trade as seafaring merchants from fortified coastal posts. They were weakest when their commercial objectives called for substantial intervention in the social fabric of the communities in which they wished to trade. This weakness was revealed during the pepper trade in Malabar. Though pepper was exported from the sea, most of the pepper was produced inland. While the VOC controlled the ships and forts, they did not have full control over the social fabric of the people who produced pepper. Because of this, the VOC's monopoly was always more aspirational than actual.

Travancore, Colachel and the Crisis of Dutch Authority
Throughout the late 1700s, the rise of Travancore under Marthanda Varma presented a serious threat to Dutch authority in Malabar. The expansion of Travancore upset the political status quo and jeopardized the Dutch's pepper agreements with many smaller states. The Dutch East India Company attempted to preserve its economic interests by meddling in the politics of the region, but the consolidation of Travancore as a local state signified a significant shift in power relations. As a result, Marthanda Varma was creating a strong territorial state rather than simply being another leader negotiating for pepper supply; he was developing an entity that would be a viable challenger to the influence of Europeans.
On account of these developments, the conflict between Travancore and the Dutch culminated in the 1741 Battle of Colachel, where Travancore achieved a decisive victory against the Dutch. The capture of the Dutch commander Eustachius De Lannoy, who later served in the Travancore military, also indicated a dramatic change in Europe's military relationship with the South Indian state system. Although the Colachel Campaign by itself did not immediately end Dutch trade, it highlighted the weakness of the Dutch VOC as a military power. With the victory at Colachel, an Indian regional power was able to defeat a European state-like entity and force it to reassess its goals and objectives.
In southern Kerala, the Dutch authority was weakened subsequent to Colachel. The company now had diminished capacity to coerce Travancore into compliance with its demands, and its claims to be the sole authority in the region began to seem increasingly implausible. The consequence of the loss at Colachel extended beyond the military; the defeat would also have psychological and diplomatic implications. The loss severely diminished the company’s credibility, which had been essential to the VOC’s ability to negotiate with other powers on the basis of their military reputation. In the early modern period, the Indian Ocean was a theatre in which the reputation of a company was more than just a matter of prestige; it was a basic prerequisite for successfully coercing obedience from Indian rulers and merchants.
The rise of Travancore also illustrates that the eighteenth century was not simply a period of European expansion in India, but rather a period in which Indian states, European companies and regional elites competed for resources as a result of intense political reconfiguration in the region. Ultimately, the British established themselves as the dominant colonial power in the region, but the eventual outcome of this competition was not a foregone conclusion. The VOC’s failure in Malabar was, in part, a consequence of its inability to adapt to emerging regional formations of state.

Batavia, Bureaucracy and the Wider Crisis of the VOC
The Malabar decline must be understood in the context of a larger institutional crisis at the VOC. Batavia was the centre of Dutch Asia and coordinated trade, administration and political communication. However, the sheer size of the company's network became increasingly unmanageable, as officials engaged in private trade; corruption was rampant; costs were rising; and profit margins declining. The monopoly on spices earlier provided high profits has now been steadily eroded by competition, smuggling, changes in consumption patterns, and a movement toward diversification into commodities with much lower profit margins than spices, such as textiles, tea,

coffee, etc.
The VOC's organisation, which once served as an advantage, has become cumbersome. Many of its servants are scattered throughout Asia and often far away from effective supervision for the company. The company is responsible for maintaining forts, ships, warehouses, soldiers and bureaucrats across many separate political regions of Asia. The VOC is therefore neither purely a coherent state nor a flexible private business. Although the company's quasi-sovereign privileges facilitated its expansion, they also imposed military and administrative obligations on the company. As in Malabar, so too in other areas, political intervention has often resulted in economic profit being reduced.
During the 1700's the Dutch Republic began to lose power. Wars with England and France stressed the finances of the Netherlands. The power of England to dominate sea trade and be a leading commercial power grew fast. The English/ British East India Company began to expand its territorial influence in India starting in the mid-1700's with the growth of power of England in Bengal. Accordingly, the English had many more sources of revenue than the VOC. The VOC was still a major contributor to the Western economy but was in a very disadvantageous position of not being able to match the type of military / financial resources that the British had gained through their conquests.
The navy and political power of the Dutch had also declined causing additional issues for the VOC. The VOC depended on the protection of trade routes by the Dutch government as well as support for its colonies abroad. As the Dutch lost their comparative advantage over the English/British and French, the VOC's position internationally declined. The French Revolutionary Wars and formation of the Batavian Republic made the situation worse. By 1795, the VOC's settlement on the Malabar Coast had been surrendered to the English and by the end of 1799 the VOC had been formally disbanded. The Dutch government took over the debts and assets of the VOC.

The English East India Company and the Displacement of Dutch Malabar
One of the main reasons the VOC lost power in Malabar was because of the growth of English power through the expansion of the English East India Company. As a result, the English were able to supplant the VOC using not just superior military power from their navy, but also through flexibility in business, having a large number of alliances, and later through revenues generated from land. For example, the English cultivated relationships with local merchants and rulers to establish themselves as a trading company and source of supply for pepper, creating a basis for the eventual use of military force to establish themselves as a territorial power.
In Malabar, the English influence consisted of a base of operations at Tellicherry, as well as through other coastal towns, through which they were able to take advantage of local dissatisfaction with the Dutch monopoly. Many local merchants and rulers preferred having competition among the various European companies as this results in better pricing and less reliance on a single buyer. Thus, the VOC's monopoly in Malabar was structurally vulnerable, as it required the elimination of its competitors before it could dominate the market. However, the economic structure of Malabar was such that merchants were able to conduct business with all the various companies.
By the end of the eighteenth century, the British were much better positioned than the Dutch to integrate Malabar into a larger imperial economy, as the British had recently achieved a number of victories in India, and their naval strength and control of territories that produced significant quantities of revenue enabled them to afford the military and administrative costs to maintain control of Malabar that the VOC had great difficulty doing so. While the Dutch would continue to remain in the minds of many people and within a limited number of commercial activities, the Dutch's ability to shape the future development of Malabar had ended.
In 1795, the British ended Dutch domination on the coast when they occupied all the Dutch holdings in the area. The occupation by Great Britain showed a significant shift from an economy based on competing chartered companies to one based on colonial power and empire building in the empire. In the same way, the success of VOC as a corporation and as a model for the corporation was based on an evolving global structure of centrally controlled and income-based imperial states.

Commerce, Violence and the Moral Economy of Dutch Decline

In assessing the VOC, it is important to remember that it does not represent the idyllic golden age of Dutch ambition; rather, it developed through violence, force, and oppression. All this power was supported by gunships, fortifications, punitive military expeditions, legislated forced contracts, and trade monopolies, all of which were used to maintain control of a growing empire. Furthermore, Dutch financial wealth was based on the ongoing extraction of wealth from the colonies. The VOC was also an integral part of Dutch prosperity; however, it did not represent the only means of attaining wealth through the Dutch West India Company or through mutual support from slavery or plantation-based economies.

In contrast to building large colonial territories, the VOC's power on the Malabar coast relied on extending its commercial pressure. The effect of this monopoly on the local economy was felt at every level within the affected communities — by intervening in the livelihoods of all producers, merchants and rulers, the company attempted to stabilise supply, set prices and cut out competition. Therefore, the company's requirements for pepper directly linked the agrarian systems of the Malabar region to the consumption of Europeans, and the profits that resulted from that consumption. The presence of VOC forts and treaties brought foreign corporate power into the political life of the region.

As a result, the decline of the VOC was not merely an economic failure, but also represented a crisis of coercive legitimacy. The use of its claims to a monopoly on production was becoming increasingly difficult to enforce as local rulers resisted, competing Europeans entered the marketplace and corrupt practices within the company eroded administrative discipline. The failures of the VOC reveal the fundamental instability of a system focused on extracting value from its subjects, without maintaining control over the social environments that generated that value.

Malabar as a Lens for Understanding the VOC

The VOC is best understood in relation to Malabar, because it serves as a lens through which to view the strengths and weaknesses of the company. Strengths of the VOC included its maritime structure, financial innovation, military capability, diplomatic adaptability and commercial ambition. These strengths provided the Dutch with the attributes necessary to replace the Portuguese, seize Cochin, establish a commanding structure and become participants in the pepper trade on a global scale.

The VOC's weaknesses were also significant. It was not able to fully monopolise a commodity produced by dispersed local networks. It was not able to permanently dominate resilient regional polities. It could not prevent competition from English and French traders. It was unable to keep military expenses from cutting into commercial profits. It could not eliminate corruption and private trade among its own personnel. Finally, it was unable to transform a coastal trading presence into a permanent territorial authority in Kerala.

Therefore, Malabar demonstrates that the decline of the VOC was not only due to weakness of Dutch metropolitan government or due to administrative corruption within the VOC but also the result of the actions of Asian rulers, merchants and societies. Travancore's resistance, local avoidance of monopoly and the continued existence of alternative trade routes all played a role in the undermining of Dutch authority. Although the VOC was a global corporation, it continued to be defined and limited by local histories.

Conclusion

The story of the Dutch East India Company's decline and rise Along the Malabar Coast demonstrate the intertwined complexities that define the commercial empires of early modern trade. Founded at the height of the Dutch Republic's power, in 1602, the VOC stands today as one of the largest corporate empires globally. The VOC harnessed a unique combination of capital, maritime muscle, diplomacy, and monopoly privileges that foreshadowed modern forms of global capitalism. The VOC sought to exert influence over the physical and political landscape, replace Portuguese power on the Malabar Coast, dominate the pepper trade, strengthen the City of Cochin through fortifications, and subordinate local commerce to the VOC's commercial interests.

However, the VOC's failure on the Malabar Coast illustrates the challenges the company faced and why it eventually failed. The company's interest and ambition for control of the pepper monopoly could not be completely supported through its own resources due to the reliance upon local rulers, merchants, and producers to attain their interest in holding power over the production and flow of pepper. The establishment of Travancore, defeat at Colachel, increasing competition from the British, and exponentially increasing costs associated with militarised trade caused the VOC to suffer significant losses of power and influence. By the end of the 18th century, the VOC was completely exhausted financially, politically vulnerable, and strategically obsolete. The disbandment of the VOC in 1799 symbolically marked the end of that phase of corporate empire.

The Dutch Company (VOC) Malabar was much more than just European dominance, as its history complicates that narrative. The Dutch were a powerful force during this time; however, they had limitations when it came to absolute power. The Dutch companies were able to achieve their ascendance through maritime force and commercial innovation, but the same is true regarding limitations to their success as a desired monopoly in the politically complicated and competitive world of that period.

Malabar was not merely an area that was never absorbed by the Dutch's capitalism; instead, Malabar became an active theatre of history with ruling powers, merchants, commodities, and competing imperialist powers (such as the British, French and Portuguese) all contributing to the ultimate outcome for one of the most successful companies in history.

Works Cited

1. Ali, Daud. "The Idea of the Medieval in the Writing of South Asian History: Contexts, Methods and Politics." Social History, vol. 39, no. 3, 2014, pp. 382–407.
2. Boxer, C. R. The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600–1800. Penguin, 1990.
3. Chaudhuri, K. N. The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company, 1660–1760. Cambridge UP, 1978.
4. Crump, Thomas. A Brief History of the Age of Discovery. Robinson, 2009.
5. Gaastra, Femme S. The Dutch East India Company: Expansion and Decline. Walburg Pers, 2003.
6. Glamann, Kristof. Dutch-Asiatic Trade, 1620–1740. Danish Science Press, 1958.
7. Israel, Jonathan I. Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585–1740. Clarendon Press, 1989.
8. Israel, Jonathan I. The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477–1806. Oxford UP, 1998.
9. Logan, William. Malabar Manual. 2 vols., Government Press, 1887.
10. Nadler, Steven. Spinoza: A Life. 2nd ed., Cambridge UP, 2018.
11. Panikkar, K. M. Malabar and the Dutch. D. B. Taraporevala Sons, 1931.
12. Prak, Maarten. The Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century. Cambridge UP, 2005.
13. Raychaudhuri, Tapan, and Irfan Habib, editors. The Cambridge Economic History of India. Volume 1: c.1200–c.1750. Cambridge UP, 1982.
14. Schama, Simon. The Embarrassment of Riches: An Interpretation of Dutch Culture in the Golden Age. University of California Press, 1988.
15. Subrahmanyam, Sanjay. The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500–1700: A Political and Economic History. 2nd ed., Wiley-Blackwell, 2012.
16. Upadhyaya, V. Dutch and English East India Companies: Diplomatic and Commercial Relations in India. Munshiram Manoharlal, 1978.
17. Welie, Rik van. "Slave Trading and Slavery in the Dutch Colonial Empire: A Global Comparison." New West Indian Guide, vol. 82, no. 1/2, 2008, pp. 47–96.
18. Wheelock, Arthur K., Jr. Vermeer and the Art of Painting. Yale UP, 1995.